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CIVIL RIGHTS PARADOX? LAWYERS AND 
EDUCATIONAL EQUITY 
David M. Engstrom* 
INTRODUCTION 
In the past fifty years, lawyers have become increasingly 
involved in attempts to reform American public education. Along 
the way, they have achieved an incredible string of victories. 
Lawyer-led reform efforts have, among other things, challenged 
the constitutionality of segregated schooling, created constit-
utional and statutory rights to education for disabled, non-
English-speaking, and immigrant students, and, in some states, 
forced the overhaul of state school finance systems in direct 
opposition to the cherished American value of local fiscal 
control. 
But law-driven reform efforts have also fallen short on at 
least some fronts. High segregation levels remain and may have 
even risen in recent years.1 Average reading, math, and science 
scores for African-American students lag several years behind the 
average reading scores of their white counterparts.2 Minority 
                                                          
 * J.D. Candidate, Stanford University, Class of 2002. Ph.D. Candidate 
in Political Science, Yale University. Law clerk for the Honorable Diane P. 
Wood, United States Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit, 2002-03. The 
author would like to thank Nora Freeman, Barbara Fried, Tom Grey, Pam 
Karlan, Mark Kelman, Josh Klein, and Bill Koski for their helpful criticism. 
All errors are mine. 
1 See GARY ORFIELD, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET 
REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 53-55 (1997). 
2 For example, in 1995-96, average scores of thirteen year old black 
students on the reading, math, and science segments of the National 
Assessment of Educational Progress Tests were, respectively, thirty-one, 
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students are also more likely than whites to drop out of high 
school.3 The proportion of disabled students who fail to earn a 
standard high school diploma is roughly six times that of non-
disabled students.4 Per-pupil spending disparities between states 
are large.5 Interdistrict disparities in per-pupil spending are even 
greater.6 Family income remains the most reliable predictor of a 
                                                          
twenty-nine, and forty points lower than their white counterparts. See BUREAU 
OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 
OF THE UNITED STATES: 2000 178 tbl. 286 (2000) [hereinafter STATISTICAL 
ABSTRACT 2000]. 
3 In 1998, the white drop-out rate was 4.4%, the black drop-out rate was 
5.0%, and the Hispanic drop-out rate was 8.4%. The total percentage of 
whites, blacks, and Hispanics who had not completed high school and were 
not enrolled in 1998 was 13.7%, 17.1%, and 34.4% respectively. See 
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 2000, supra note 2, at 180 tbl. 290. 
4 In 1997-98, 29% of all students with disabilities ages seventeen to 
twenty-one and 74% of students with disabilities exiting the educational system 
(i.e., graduating, receiving a certificate of completion, reaching the maximum 
age for services, or dropping out) received a standard high school diploma. By 
comparison, the high school completion rate hovers near 90% for non-disabled 
students. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, TO ASSURE THE FREE 
APPROPRIATE PUBLIC EDUCATION OF ALL CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES: 
TWENTIETH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT iv-34 (1998) [hereinafter 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, TO ASSURE THE FREE APPROPRIATE 
PUBLIC EDUCATION OF ALL CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES]. 
5 In 1999, average per-pupil expenditures in New Jersey, one of the 
highest spending states, was $10,420. The average in Mississippi, one of the 
lowest spending states, was $4,658. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 2000, supra note 
2, at 172 tbl. 275. 
6 A representative example is Ohio, where, during the 1995-96 school 
year, per pupil spending ranged from $2,346 to $13,622—a nearly six-fold 
difference. See Amy Ellen Schwartz, School Districts and Spending in the 
Schools, Consortium for Policy Research in Education, available at 
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs99/1999334/text3.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2002). 
Similarly, in 1995, the town of Eden, Vermont spent $2979 per student, while 
the town of Winhall, Vermont spent $7726. See Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 
384, 389 (Vt. 1997). The Supreme Court of Vermont noted that it was 
common for school districts to spend more than twice as much per student as 
neighboring districts. Id. Earlier school finance suits in Montana and Texas 
challenged even greater inter-district disparities. The Supreme Court of 
Montana found a nearly eight to one differential in per-pupil spending when it 
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student’s educational attainment and achievement.7 
The mixed success of lawyer-led school reform efforts has 
provided rich material for thinking about the limits of public law 
and the institutional capacity of courts to effect social and 
institutional change.8 Law-based reform efforts have also 
spawned critiques. Some blame legalization because legal decrees 
produce inflexibility and force schools to devote precious 
resources to compliance matters, leaving inadequate resources to 
provide a sound educational product to needy students.9 Some 
critics go further and argue that any additional advancement of 
educational equity will require institutional shocks to the system 
that no incremental reform program can deliver.10 These critics 
                                                          
struck down that state’s school finance system in 1989. See Helena Elementary 
Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 92 (Mont. 1989). That same year, per-
pupil spending in Texas ranged from $2,112 to $19,333. See Edgewood 
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 392 (Tex. 1989). 
7 See infra note 87 and accompanying text. 
8 See, e.g., MICHAEL W. MCMANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY 
REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994); GERALD 
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL 
CHANGE? (1991). 
9 “Legalization” has been described as having three main features: “[A] 
focus on the individual as the bearer of rights, the use of legal concepts and 
modes of reasoning, and the provision of legal techniques such as written 
agreements and court-like procedures to enforce and protect rights.” See 
David Neal & David L. Kirp, The Allure of Legalization Reconsidered: The 
Case of Special Education, in SCHOOL DAYS, RULE DAYS: THE 
LEGALIZATION AND REGULATION OF EDUCATION 343, 344 (David L. Kirp & 
Donald N. Jensen eds., 1986). For a critique of legalization, see David L. 
Kirp, Introduction: The Fourth R: Reading, Writing, ‘Rithmetic—and Rules, in 
SCHOOL DAYS, RULE DAYS: THE LEGALIZATION AND REGULATION OF 
EDUCATION 1, 4 (David L. Kirp & Donald N. Jensen eds., 1986) 
(summarizing debates about whether rights- and rule-mindedness undermines 
professional authority, creates inflexibility, and produces adversarial tension 
between parents and teachers); JOEL E. HENNING, MANDATE FOR CHANGE: 
THE IMPACT OF LAW ON EDUCATIONAL INNOVATION 231 (1979) (summarizing 
survey research and reporting that many respondents “view the law and courts 
as failing to provide appropriate support and as frustrating the schools’ 
educational goals”). 
10 See Michael Heise, Choosing Equal Educational Opportunity: School 
Reform, Law, and Public Policy, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1114 (2001) 
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typically point to school choice, vouchers, and the application of 
market discipline as the surest way to wring additional equity 
from the system.11 
Jay Heubert and contributors confront these and other issues 
in a recent edited volume entitled Law & School Reform: Six 
Strategies for Promoting Educational Opportunity.12 The 
principal aim of Law & School Reform is to “tell the story of the 
growing involvement of lawyers in America’s public schools in 
the past half century” and suggest “possible future roles” for 
lawyers in “law-driven school reform.”13 The scope of the 
volume is impressive, as is the list of contributors.14 The volume 
is also the first of its kind to juxtapose the many law-driven 
school reforms of the past fifty years. The resulting bird’s eye 
view provides an ideal platform for considering the role of law 
and lawyers in school reform efforts as a whole. 
The volume’s sole failing is that Heubert does not adequately 
capitalize on the unique perspective his volume offers. Relying 
on the impressive scope of Law & School Reform, this review 
                                                          
(“[A] structural assault on the education status quo is almost assuredly a 
necessary condition for the generation of much needed and desired education 
reform.”). 
11 JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA’S 
SCHOOLS (1990). For a seminal statement, see MILTON FRIEDMAN, 
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962). 
12 JAY P. HEUBERT, ED., LAW & SCHOOL REFORM: SIX STRATEGIES FOR 
PROMOTING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY (Yale Univ. Press 1999). 
13 See Harold Howe II, Foreword, in LAW & SCHOOL REFORM: SIX 
STRATEGIES FOR PROMOTING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY vii (Jay. P. Heubert ed., 
1999). 
14 A partial list of the contributors includes Martin Gerry, a former 
director of the Office for Civil Rights in the U.S. Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare, Thomas Hehir, former director of the Office of 
Special Education at the U.S. Department of Education, Harold Howe II, a 
former U.S. Commissioner of Education in the Johnson Administration and 
chair of the Educational Testing Service, Martha Minow, a Harvard Law 
School professor, Gary Orfield, a professor of education and social policy at 
Harvard University and the leading academic voice on the issue of 
desegregation, Carola and Marcelo Suarez-Orozco, both professors of human 
development and psychology at Harvard University, and Paul Weckstein, a co-
director of the Center for Law and Education in Washington, D.C. 
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attempts to fill that analytic gap. I argue that lawyers involved in 
efforts to expand educational equity—including academic lawyers 
like Heubert—have too often failed to acknowledge both the 
contested premises and the unintended consequences of civil-
rights-based litigation in the area of education. In fact, the 
successful civil rights assault on racial segregation and the 
categorical exclusion of disabled and other student groups from 
public schooling has given way to a world in which resource 
allocations, not access, determine educational equity. Reform-
minded lawyers need to realize that, beyond the dismantlement of 
Jim Crow and the opening of schoolhouse gates to excluded 
groups, an important legacy of the law-driven reform efforts of 
the past half-century has been the exacerbation of what many 
increasingly see as a perverse allocation of educational resources 
among the many student groups who make claims on scarce 
resources. Of particular note is the relative allocation of 
resources to students with disabilities as opposed to student 
groups who suffer from other forms of disadvantage. 
The blind spot for lawyers has been understanding how law-
driven reform efforts fit together and, in particular, how legal 
mobilizations in one policy area shape resource allocations 
elsewhere in the educational system. This failure is 
understandable. Lawyers tend to operate as part of particular 
legal mobilizations on behalf of particular groups. Lawyers also 
remain bound by professional-ethical obligations that demand 
zealous pursuit of localized client interests. A third possible 
explanation is that the inclusionary impulse of Brown v. Board of 
Education15 is so strong within legal and political culture that it 
tends to cloud more policy-analytic thinking about how to 
allocate scarce resources within the American system of public 
education. Whatever the cause, the law and education field seems 
to suffer from a disconnect between lawyers and policy analysis. 
This review thus adds a voice to emerging scholarly analysis that 
critiques the allocation of resources in the American educational 
system and the ways in which civil rights-oriented school reform 
efforts have contributed to that state of affairs. 
                                                          
15 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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This review proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview 
of the volume and highlights the principal arguments advanced by 
Heubert in his introductory essay: that lawyers should develop 
more policy-specific knowledge and should in turn deploy that 
knowledge in non-adjudicative and collaborative settings. Part II 
offers a brief critique of both tenets of Heubert’s prescription. 
Part III breaks through the more compartmentalized accounts of 
different law-driven school reforms offered in Law & School 
Reform and sketches a broader and more dominant story. In 
particular, I argue that law-driven school reforms over the past 
half-century—particularly those that derive from civil rights-
based mobilizations—highlight an important tension between 
bureaucratic and inclusionary reformist impulses. The former 
impulse focuses on targeted resource infusions as a way of 
maximizing educational outcomes. The latter is a legal-cultural 
inclusionary impulse that extends from the integration vision 
articulated in Brown. This tension is particularly important in 
light of the declining significance of race as a basis for resource 
claims, and the parallel expansion of the importance of other 
protected characteristics—particularly disability—as a basis for 
redistributions. Understanding this tension, I argue, provides the 
best lens for understanding the civil rights paradox at the heart of 
law-driven school reforms. Part IV asks whether lawyers are to 
blame for the current state of affairs and how they might avoid 
such problems going forward. In the end, I conclude that lawyers 
have little comparative advantage in much of what lies ahead, but 
that lawyers might still play a key role by policing a political 
process that can sometimes skew redistributions and by helping to 
make whatever political choices emerge from that process more 
transparent within the system as a whole. 
I.  OVERVIEW OF LAW & SCHOOL REFORM 
What are “law-driven school reforms”? Law & School 
Reform focuses on six: desegregation; school finance reform; 
immigrant education; special education; school-linked service 
integration; and enforceable rights to quality education. The book 
methodically steps through the different approaches, devoting a 
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chapter to each. The first four of these are distinct legal reform 
movements with well-established advocacy communities and long 
histories of mobilization both inside and outside courtrooms. The 
latter two are not and fit awkwardly with the rest of the volume. 
For example, service integration, as presented by Martin Gerry,16 
is an effort to link the provision of social services and other child 
supports to public schools. While school-linked service provision 
is increasingly pervasive in urban school reform efforts in 
particular,17 it is unclear how the approach is in any way “law-
driven.” Similarly, Paul Weckstein’s contribution provides a 
useful roadmap of state and federal statutory and constitutional 
provisions that together create “enforceable rights to quality 
education.”18 But the chapter is little more than a laundry list, 
and nowhere is a distinct legal movement or a significant lawyer-
led reform opportunity discernible. These final two chapters 
simply distract attention from the otherwise fascinating 
connections that exist among the first four law-driven reform 
approaches that form the meat of the book. 
Heubert spells out his editorial vision in the opening chapter. 
He seeks to “take stock systematically of a key set of law-based 
school reform efforts, each aimed at increasing educational 
opportunity.”19 Law & School Reform is meant to chart future 
reform avenues by offering up a variety of interdisciplinary 
perspectives on the origins, current status, and future prospects 
of individual reform efforts. Heubert’s principal thesis, however, 
                                                          
16 Martin Gerry, Service Integration and Beyond: Implications for 
Lawyers and Their Training, in LAW & SCHOOL REFORM: SIX STRATEGIES 
FOR PROMOTING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY 244 (Jay. P. Heubert ed., 1999). 
17 For a general discussion of school-linked service initiatives, see 
Symposium, School-Linked Services, 2 FUTURE CHILD (1992); JOY G. 
DRYFOOS, FULL-SERVICE SCHOOLS: A REVOLUTION IN HEALTH AND SOCIAL 
SERVICES FOR CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND FAMILIES (1994). 
18 Paul Weckstein, School Reform and Enforceable Rights to Quality 
Education, in LAW & SCHOOL REFORM: SIX STRATEGIES FOR PROMOTING 
EDUCATIONAL EQUITY 306 (Jay. P. Heubert ed., 1999). 
19 Jay P. Heubert, Six Law-Driven School Reforms: Developments, 
Lessons, and Prospects, in LAW & SCHOOL REFORM: SIX STRATEGIES FOR 
PROMOTING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY 3 (Jay. P. Heubert ed., 1999). 
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is built around trend analysis and his sense that reform-minded 
lawyers currently face a much more nuanced and complex set of 
educational policy questions than their forebears.20 Lawyers 
involved in the civil rights movements of the 1950s, 60s, and 70s 
deployed morally clear-cut rights claims in the fight against the 
segregation of African-Americans and the outright exclusion of 
the disabled21 and immigrants22 from public schools. Current 
legal struggles, by contrast, center on much subtler and more 
contested questions of how to implement and thus give content to 
rights previously won. As Heubert writes, the initial focus on 
overcoming segregation and categorical exclusion has given way 
to a “greater emphasis on serving children more effectively 
within schools and on helping students meet high standards for 
academic achievement.”23 It is this critical shift in focus—from 
ensuring access from without to ensuring quality of instruction 
from within—that creates both challenges and opportunities for 
reform-minded education lawyers.24 
The most illustrative example of the complexities and 
challenges of rights implementation is the education of the 
                                                          
20 Id. at 9, 16. 
21 For a thorough account beyond that provided in LAW & SCHOOL 
REFORM, see R. SHEP MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LINES: INTERPRETING 
WELFARE RIGHTS 135-59 (1994). 
22 Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
23 Heubert, supra note 19, at 3. 
24 Another way to think about the contrast between rights creation and 
rights implementation is that the former involves adjudication of rights in a 
context in which most of the relevant facts are stipulated to, and the court’s 
only job is to decide whether they constitute a violation of legal norms. The 
latter involves adjudication in a context in which the court must ascertain and 
interpret the relevant facts in the first instance. Brown, then, is a paradigmatic 
example of rights creation, insofar as the parties stipulated to the existence of 
de jure discrimination, and the announced rule did not go beyond announcing 
that such a practice violated equal protection. Current litigation efforts, by 
contrast, involve rights implementation because courts must ascertain and 
interpret a variety of facts that are difficult to get a handle on, because of the 
difficulty of measuring outcomes, determining which remedies are 
implementable, and penetrating school bureaucracies. 
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disabled. Hehir and Gamm’s chapter25 on special education 
recounts how early victories in federal courts, including PARC v. 
Commonwealth26 and Mills v. Board of Education,27 and the 
passage of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act 
(“EHA”) in 1975—now referred to as the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”)—created legally enforceable 
rights to a “free and appropriate education” in “the least 
restrictive environment.”28 At the school level, the newly-minted 
rights sparked nearly three decades of lawyer-supervised design 
of Individualized Education Programs (“IEP”)29 and the ongoing 
evolution of caselaw defining “appropriate education” and the 
extent of accommodation and “mainstreaming” that school 
                                                          
25 Thomas Hehir & Sue Gamm, Special Education: From Legalism to 
Collaboration, in LAW & SCHOOL REFORM: SIX STRATEGIES FOR PROMOTING 
EDUCATIONAL EQUITY 205 (Jay. P. Heubert ed., 1999). 
26 342 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972). 
27 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). 
28 The passage of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act in 
1975 further consolidated the special education provision. 20 U.S.C. §§1400-
1487 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). Renamed the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act in 1990, the IDEA is currently the primary source of federal 
aid to state and local school systems for programs and services for infants, 
toddlers, children, and youth with disabilities. The IDEA creates a statutory 
right to a “free appropriate public education” to all children with disabilities. 
Id. at § 1412(a)(1). Under the IDEA, states have the primary responsibility for 
providing special education programs and services to school-age children with 
disabilities. 
29 The IDEA requires that special education and related services be 
provided on an individualized basis in accordance with the disabled child’s 
individualized education plan (“IEP”). 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(4). Under the 
IDEA, schools must develop an IEP for every disabled student. Id. The plan 
includes a written statement of the child’s educational needs and specific goals, 
methodologies, and evaluation procedures for meeting them, and must contain 
“specially designed instruction to meet the unique needs of children with 
disabilities.” Id. at § 1414(d)(1)(A). In addition, schools must ensure that due 
process protections are in place to ensure compliance on the part of local 
education agencies. If there is a dispute between parents and school authorities 
about the content of an IEP, then parents can appeal the proposed IEP to an 
administrative hearing officer, and if still unsatisfied, to the state or federal 
courts. Id. at § 1415(f), (g), (i). 
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districts are legally obligated to provide to students with 
disabilities.30 While early litigants faced the daunting task of 
minting new rights, subsequent generations of education lawyers 
have worked to ensure the proper implementation of those rights 
at the ground level. 
One reason that the elaboration of rights in the school equity 
context has proven so complex is that rights implementation 
requires the institutional engagement of schools. Earlier legal 
challenges to segregation and categorical exclusions could be 
done at a remove from the daily activities and operation of 
schools. Jim Crow policies barring African-American students 
from white schools, for example, could be met with the abstract 
claim that the Equal Protection Clause forbids categorization 
based on race. Indeed, the peculiar power of rights claims flows 
in part from the fact that rights exist as abstract trumps that are 
removed from complicated institutional contexts.31 
But the implementation of rights in the current education 
context increasingly requires lawyers to understand and argue by 
reference to the professional practices and norms of teachers and 
administrators. For example, the contributions by Gary Orfield 
and Paul Weckstein both describe litigation arising from claims 
that many school districts perpetuate intra-school racial 
                                                          
30 Important Supreme Court decisions include the following: Cedar 
Rapids Comm. Sch. Dist. v. Garrett F., 526 U.S. 66 (1999) (requiring school 
district to provide full-time nursing services to disabled student during school 
hours); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988) (holding that the IDEA forbids 
schools from expelling students for behaviors related to their handicaps); 
Board of Ed. of Hendrick Hudson Central Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 
(1982) (defining “free appropriate public education”). The remaining caselaw 
is too numerous to summarize here. For a comprehensive summary of recent 
caselaw on diagnosis and placement, see Perry A. Zirkel, Special Education 
Law Update VII, 160 ED. LAW REP. 1 (2002). 
31 See RONALD DWORKIN, Rights As Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 
153, 153 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984) (“Rights are best understood as trumps 
over some background justification for political decisions that states a goal for 
the community as a whole.”); see also Thomas C. Grey, Cover-Blindness, 88 
CALIF. L. REV. 65, 67 (2000) (offering an interpretive account of employment 
discrimination law that sets up a similar contrast between abstract and more 
contextualized rights claims). 
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segregation by creating tracks within the curriculum and 
separating students into groups based on “purported differences 
in student ability.”32 However, to claim that a school district’s 
practice of ability grouping has a segregatory effect requires 
litigants and the legal system to engage the school as an 
institution to root out and assess the extent to which the 
challenged practices serve the purported end of ability grouping 
and the extent to which they provide cover for racial 
discrimination. The same is true with respect to bilingual 
education and programs that serve Limited English Proficient 
(“LEP”) children. In both cases, making out a successful legal 
claim is no longer an abstract proposition about access to public 
institutions, but instead requires courts to fuse legal doctrine and 
complex analysis of educational and pedagogical practice. 
Heubert seems to identify a similar aspect of institutional 
engagement when he asserts that the interaction of law and 
education has been characterized in recent years by a “significant 
convergence of legal standards and educational norms.”33 In 
particular, present-day reform efforts are greatly complicated by 
the fact that rights and remedies are increasingly defined by 
reference to educational practices and student outcomes.34 Molly 
McUsic’s contribution on school finance reform provides the 
clearest example. Over the past thirty years, legal challenges to 
state school financing formulas have arisen in response to the 
sometimes enormous inter-district disparities in per-pupil 
spending that result from the funding of public education through 
local property taxes.35 Early state constitutional challenges to 
school finance regimes relied upon state equal protection clauses 
and so-called education clauses.36 Dubbed the “equity” approach, 
                                                          
32 Weckstein, supra note 18, at 341; see also Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. 
Supp. 1306, aff’d, 502 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1974). 
33 Heubert, supra note 19, at 4.  
34 Id. at 32. 
35 For an up-to-date listing of cases brought, see Molly S. McUsic, The 
Law’s Role in the Distribution of Education: The Promises and Pitfalls of 
School Finance Litigation, in LAW & SCHOOL REFORM: SIX STRATEGIES FOR 
PROMOTING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY 90 n.8 (Jay. P. Heubert ed., 1999). 
36 See Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School 
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plaintiffs boldly argued that state constitutions required equality 
under the law and therefore a leveling of school finance.37 
Successive waves of school finance reform have followed an 
“adequacy” approach, relying on the same coupling of state equal 
protection clauses and education clauses as did earlier “equity” 
lawsuits, but arguing instead for a more limited right to a 
constitutionally “adequate” education.38 In some successful 
lawsuits, state supreme courts have actively engaged in the 
process of defining educational “adequacy,” going so far as to 
construct a list of basic competencies that must be taught in order 
for the system as a whole to pass constitutional muster.39 
                                                          
Finance Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101, 105 (1995) (“[E]very state, with the 
arguable exception of Mississippi, includes in its constitution an ‘education 
clause’ that assigns to the state the responsibility for establishment of a public 
school system.”); Molly McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School 
Finance Litigation, 28 HARV. J. LEGIS. 307, 333-39 (1991) (categorizing state 
educational clauses by the rigor of the requirements set forth in each); see also 
William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Implications of the Montana, 
Kentucky, and Texas Decisions for the Future of Public School Finance 
Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. & EDUC. 219, 225-32 (1990). 
37 See McUsic, supra note 35, at 89; see also Enrich, supra note 36, at 
106-08, 125-26. 
38 See Enrich, supra note 36; William H. Clune, New Answers to Hard 
Questions Posed by Rodriguez: Ending the Separation of School Finance and 
Education Policy by Bridging the Gap Between Wrong and Remedy, 24 CONN. 
L. REV. 721, 733 (1992). 
39 In Rose v. Council for Better Education, the Kentucky Supreme Court 
spelled out seven “essential competencies” that a minimally adequate 
education would instill in its students, stating the following: 
An efficient system of education must have as its goal to provide each 
and every child with at least the seven following capacities: 
(i) sufficient oral and written communication skills to enable students 
to function in a complex and rapidly changing civilization 
(ii) sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and political systems to 
enable students to make informed choices 
(iii) sufficient understanding of governmental processes to enable the 
student to understand the issues that affect his or her community, 
state, and nation 
(iv) sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental and 
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Similarly, in its effort to fashion remedies in the state’s long-
standing school finance litigation, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
recently sanctioned the wholesale adoption of a specific school 
reform package called “Success for All” as a way to meet 
obligations under the state constitution.40 These examples 
illustrate the fact that legal standards such as “adequacy” acquire 
meaning only by reference to educational practices and 
professional norms. The inevitable result is greater institutional 
engagement of schools by the legal system. 
Having exhaustively demonstrated the law’s increasing 
institutional engagement of schools and the convergence of legal 
standards and educational norms, Heubert sets forth two related 
proposals for lawyers seeking to deploy law to advance 
educational equity. First, he asserts that lawyers must develop a 
greater understanding of the nuts and bolts of education policy if 
they wish to contribute to the lawyer-educator collaboration that 
he sees as critical to the success of present-day reform efforts.41 
Second, Heubert argues that lawyers who wish to contribute to 
school reform must develop non-adjudicative skills and learn to 
“function effectively in the larger political process, as legislators, 
regulators, mediators, and consensus builders.”42 By developing 
more policy-specific knowledge and deploying that knowledge in 
non-adjudicative and collaborative settings, Heubert believes that 
                                                          
physical wellness 
(v) sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to 
appreciate his or her cultural and historical heritage 
(vi) sufficient training or preparation for advanced training in either 
academic or vocational fields so as to enable each child to choose and 
pursue life work intelligently; and 
(vii) sufficient level of academic or vocational skills to enable public 
school students to compete favorably with their counterparts in 
surrounding states, in academics or in the job market. 
Rose v. Council for a Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989). 
40 See Abbott v. Burke, 710 A.2d 450, 457 (N.J. 1998). For a description 
of Success for All, see the program’s website at http://www.successforall 
.com/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2002). 
41 Heubert, supra note 19, at 6-7. 
42 Id. at 5. 
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lawyers can continue to make inroads against persistent 
educational inequities. 
II.  A CRITIQUE 
Heubert’s claim that lawyers can better represent clients in 
education-related litigation with a stronger substantive policy 
background has superficial appeal. After all, who could argue 
with greater policy learning on the part of lawyers bringing 
education-related claims? To the extent that Law & School 
Reform facilitates broader understanding of how law and policy 
interact, the book will likely advance equality of educational 
opportunity at the margins. But Heubert’s call for greater policy 
learning, lawyer-educator collaboration, and non-adjudicative 
reform approaches as a means of dramatically advancing 
educational equity is naively optimistic. Many of the contributors 
to Law & School Reform tend to overstate the reach of law in 
past education reform efforts, fail to specify the advantages of 
non-adjudicative approaches to reform, gloss over contentious 
empirical debates among educational policy experts about the 
effectiveness of particular policies, and overstate consensus on 
important values issues. Many of these weaknesses result from a 
failure to see that educational policy debates are beset by 
empirical indeterminacy and deep values conflicts. As a 
consequence, the move to non-adjudication and collaboration 
risks consigning lawyers to the dismal role of debate mediator. 
Indeed, reading Law & School Reform, one wonders whether 
lawyers, law, and legal institutions can retain any comparative 
advantage at all over other policy actors in future reform efforts. 
A.  Non-Adjudication and Comparative Disadvantage 
Non-adjudicative approaches to social and institutional reform 
have come into fashion in the last two decades, piggybacking on 
broader shifts in the law away from legal adversarialism and 
toward alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”).43 The 
                                                          
43 JONATHAN MARKS ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN AMERICA: 
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attractiveness of such non-adjudicative approaches has been 
enhanced by the perceived shortcomings and social costs of more 
litigation-focused approaches to institutional and social reform.44 
The move to non-adjudicative approaches has also been 
occasioned by a sustained assault on “judicial activism” and 
concern about an “imperial judiciary” in response to growing 
judicial involvement in the reform of public institutions.45 Public 
law litigation, critics have zealously argued, violates core 
principles of separation of powers and produces perverse policy 
results because courts lack the institutional capacity to carry out 
broad remedial tasks.46 Nevertheless, beginning in 1954 with the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education,47 
federal courts have become increasingly involved in remedial 
oversight of basic functions of state and local governments. 
Judicial remedial involvement accelerated throughout the 1960s 
                                                          
PROGRESS IN EVOLUTION 36-37 (1984); see also LINDA R. SINGER, SETTLING 
DISPUTES 1-14 (1994) (detailing the origins and growth of the ADR 
approach). 
44 See generally THOMAS F. BURKE, LITIGATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: 
THE STRUGGLE OVER LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS IN AMERICAN 
POLITICS (forthcoming 2002) (detailing anti-litigation reforms adopted in the 
United States since the late 1960s); see also ROSENBERG, supra note 8, at 336. 
45 Nathan Glazer, Toward an Imperial Judiciary, 41 PUB. INTEREST 104, 
104 (1975). 
46 See DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 18 
(1977) (arguing that the relevant question in the expansion of judicial oversight 
of public policy matters is not “whether courts should perform certain tasks 
but . . . whether they can perform them competently”); JEREMY RABKIN, 
JUDICIAL COMPULSIONS: HOW PUBLIC LAW DISTORTS PUBLIC POLICY 20 
(1989) (“Courts are entirely unequipped to act as ongoing, freestanding 
guardians of administrative performance.”). But see Ralph Cavanaugh & 
Austin Sarat, Thinking About Courts: Toward and Beyond a Jurisprudence of 
Judicial Competence, 14 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 371, 373 (1980) (arguing that 
critiques based on institutional competency “underestimate the demonstrated 
ability of courts to evolve new mechanisms and procedures in response to 
implicit or explicit societal demands”); Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge 
in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1282 (1976) (rebutting 
critics of the public law model and arguing that public law litigation is both 
workable and inevitable in an increasingly regulated society). 
47 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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and 70s as a wide range of judicial decrees implemented reforms 
in public institutions beyond schools, including jails,48 prisons,49 
mental health facilities,50 and housing projects.51 
Most contemporary calls for non-adjudicative reform 
approaches aim, at least in part, to respond to the foregoing 
criticisms. But as a definitional matter, it is not at all clear that 
the new approaches advocated by Heubert and the contributors to 
Law & School Reform are really non-adjudicative in any strong 
sense.52 Indeed, most of the non-adjudicative approaches cited by 
proponents involve consent decrees and judge-imposed “dialogic 
remedies.” They are clearly “quasi-adjudicative.” And even 
purely non-adjudicative negotiations involving lawyers and 
                                                          
48 See, e.g., Taylor v. Perini, 413 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Ohio 1976). 
49 See, e.g., Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff’d in 
relevant part sub nom, Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977); 
Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff’d and remanded, 
507 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1974), on remand, 389 F. Supp. 964, amended, 396 F. 
Supp. 1195 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff’d, 527 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1975), Rhem v. 
Malcolm, 432 F. Supp. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 
825 (E.D. Ark. 1969), 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff’d, 442 F.2d 
304 (8th Cir. 1971); Battle v. Anderson, 376 F. Supp. 402 (E.D. Okla. 1974). 
50 See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), 
344 F. Supp 373 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff’d in part, Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 
F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); New York Ass’n of Retarded Children v. 
Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). 
51 See, e.g., Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976). 
52 Similar definitional matters have occupied other commentators as well. 
Compare Charles Berger, Equity Without Adjudication: Kansas School 
Finance Reform and the 1992 School District Finance and Quality 
Performance Act, 27 J.L. & EDUC. 1 (1998) (arguing that use of a non-
adjudicative reform model was critical to the success of school finance reform 
in Kansas) with Perry A. Zirkel, Non-Adjudicative? You Be the Judge, 28 J.L. 
& EDUC. 231, 233 (1999) (questioning Berger’s characterization of the Kansas 
reform process as “non-adjudicative,” because the “Mock” opinion that 
spurred the process was “preceded and proceeded” by state supreme court 
opinions); Ralph Puerta, A Pennsylvania Perspective on Charles Berger’s 
“Equity Without Adjudication,” 28 J.L. & EDUC. 235, 236 (1999) (comparing 
school finance reform efforts in Kansas and school finance litigation in 
Pennsylvania and questioning whether the former approach was truly “non-
adjudicative”). 
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educators but no actual judicial intervention are conducted in the 
“shadow of the law” with the threat of litigation hanging over the 
proceedings throughout.53 
Most significantly, Law & School Reform provides no real 
explanation why quasi-adjudicative approaches to school reform 
will necessarily yield better results than past litigation efforts. 
Establishing the mixed success of past litigation efforts is easy 
enough. Indeed, there is substantial evidence that litigants 
involved in reform efforts may have overestimated the reach of 
courts in the public educational system. For example, 
desegregation litigation has had only mixed success, given 
continuing high levels of segregation. Similarly, even though 
substantial time and energy have been devoted to school finance 
litigation efforts over the past thirty years, the empirical evidence 
in states where school finance challenges prevailed suggests that 
courts’ ability to influence education spending is mixed.54 In 
states like Connecticut, Texas, and New Jersey, the typical result 
has been serial litigation with extensive judicial-political dialogue 
but insignificant narrowing of spending inequities between school 
districts.55 The principal reason for the mixed success of school 
finance reform efforts is political: the allocation of dollars to 
school districts is dictated by complicated funding formulas that 
                                                          
53 Robert Mnoonkin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of 
the Law, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979). 
54 Compare McUsic, supra note 35, at 105 (“[M]ost data indicate that the 
school finance regimes adopted under court order have generally led to more 
equitable funding.”), William N. Evans, Schoolhouses, Courthouses, and 
Statehouses After Serrano, 16 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 10, 28 (1997) 
(same), and Alan Hickrod, The Effect of Constitutional Litigation on 
Education Finance, 18 J. EDUC. FIN. 180, 207-208 (1992) (same) with 
Michael Heise, State Constitutional Litigation, Educational Finance, and 
Legal Impact: An Empirical Analysis, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1735, 1763 (1995) 
(“When the results are considered together, the picture that emerges does not 
support the general assumption that state supreme court decisions involving 
equity lawsuits that invalidate school finance systems result in increased 
educational spending.”). 
55 See Mark Jaffe & Kenneth Kersch, Guaranteeing a State Right to a 
Quality Education: The Judicial-Political Dialogue in New Jersey, 20 J.L. & 
EDUC. 271, 297 (1991). 
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are periodically revised and precisely mirror the political balance 
of power in a given state. Governors and legislatures resent the 
reformers’ efforts to use courts to circumvent the elected 
branches and to force their hand on basic resource allocation 
issues. By contrast, in states like Kentucky, where significant 
mobilization took place prior to the state supreme court’s 
decision, the legislature responded to the court’s decree with a 
near-total overhaul of the state’s educational system.56 Lacking 
the sword and purse, and dependent on other branches for 
implementation, courts engaged in school reform efforts have had 
substantial difficulty implementing decrees without an 
accompanying political mobilization. 
The problem is that non- and quasi-adjudicative reform 
efforts have probably not fared any better than more traditional 
litigation efforts in meeting reformers’ goals. Reform efforts 
have yielded mixed results when courts have combined litigation 
with non-adjudicative approaches at the remedial stage. The 
recent utilization of a so-called “dialogic remedy” failed to make 
much headway in the remedial process following the Connecticut 
Supreme Court’s decision in Sheff v. O’Neill.57 In that case, 
having declared unconstitutional the “de facto racial and ethnic 
segregation”58 of students in Hartford public schools, the court 
deferred to the legislative and executive branches to “put the 
search for appropriate remedial measures at the top of their 
respective agendas.”59 The resulting statewide public engagement 
process sputtered and died, with no significant change in the 
delivery or finance of public education in Connecticut’s racially 
                                                          
56 See Enrich, supra note 36, at 175-77; see also John Dayton, The 
Judicial-Political Dialogue: A Comment on Jaffe and Kersch’s “Guaranteeing 
a State Right to a Quality Education,” 22 J.L. & EDUC. 323, 325 (1993) 
(arguing that judicial decrees without popular support cannot produce 
meaningful education reform). 
57 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996). 
58 Id. at 1271. 
59 Id. at 1290. For analysis of the Connecticut Supreme Court’s Sheff 
decision, see James E. Ryan, Sheff, Segregation, and School Finance 
Litigation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 529 (1999). 
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isolated inner-city schools.60 Similarly, the court presiding over 
school finance reform in Alabama appointed a facilitator to work 
with the parties on a proposed remedial order and at least initially 
managed to cobble together an “impressive consensus” on reform 
directions.61 However, consensus quickly unraveled and the 
shape of reforms quickly became a partisan and hotly-contested 
issue. Substantial litigation has ensued.62 
As a final point, Heubert and the other contributors fail to 
address the possibility that the checkered success of past reform 
efforts stems from the fact that public schools are particularly 
complex bureaucracies, rather than from the inherent limitations 
of public law litigation as a reform vehicle. The standard critique 
of public law litigation is that courts are peculiarly unsuited to the 
task of institutional reform.63 But it may also be the case that 
schools are much more resistant to reform efforts than other 
public institutions. For example, organizational theorists see 
schools as “loosely coupled” bureaucratic forms that lack the 
clear lines of authority and accountability that ensure productivity 
in other bureaucratic environments.64 Much of what goes on in 
                                                          
60 See Michael A. Rebell & Robert L. Hughes, Efficacy and Engagement: 
The Remedies Problem Posed by Sheff v. O’Neill—And a Proposed Solution, 
29 CONN. L. REV. 1115, 1143-1158 (1997) (proposing a “dialogic approach” 
as a remedial option in the Sheff litigation). For an account of the failure of the 
process to effect any significant reform, see Kathryn A. McDermott, 
Regionalism Forestalled: Metropolitan Fragmentation and Desegregation 
Planning in Greater New Haven, Connecticut, in CHANGING URBAN 
EDUCATION 45 (Clarence Stone ed., 1998). 
61 See Michael A. Rebell & Robert L. Hughes, Schools, Communities, 
and the Courts: A Dialogic Approach to Education Reform, 14 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 99, 161 & nn. 248-52 (1996). 
62 Id.; see also, Martha I. Morgan et al., Establishing Education Program 
Inadequacy: The Alabama Example, 28 MICH. J.L. REF. 559, 562-63 n.15 
(1995) (describing the post-trial litigation). 
63 See supra note 46. 
64 See Karl E. Weick, Educational Organizations as Loosely Coupled 
Systems, 21 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 1, 1 (1976); see also JAMES Q. WILSON, 
BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 
158-71 (1989) (arguing that, as public bureaucracies, schools are particularly 
vulnerable to goal, output, and outcome uncertainty). 
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schools takes place behind closed doors by teachers who enjoy 
significant discretion over day-to-day activities.65 In addition, as 
“open systems,” schools must mediate and overcome clashes 
between a wide range of stakeholders, including state and local 
professionals, teachers and their unions, elected officials, school 
boards, administrators, parents and their associations, students, 
community activists, the media, business leaders, and 
foundations.66 The resulting lack of accountability and pursuit of 
proximate goals by interested parties makes change difficult. This 
is true whether the change at issue involves implementation of a 
consent decree or attempts to alter particular teacher practices in 
the classroom. 
In the end, any effort to effect substantive and lasting reform 
is difficult because it is notoriously difficult to dislodge schools’ 
“accustomed practice and organization.”67 And this is probably 
true whether would-be reformers employ adjudicative or quasi-
adjudicative means. Thus, the assumptions and analysis that 
undergird Heubert’s call for more non-adjudicative and 
collaborative activity clearly need further examination and 
support. 
B.  Policy Learning and a Dismal Role for Lawyers 
Equally problematic is the second component of Heubert’s 
call for a “new legalization” of school reform efforts—greater 
                                                          
65 See MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF 
THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICE 13-18 (1980). 
66 See Marilyn Gittell, School Reform in New York and Chicago: 
Revisiting the Ecology of Local Games, 30 URB. AFF. Q. 136, 138 (describing 
the role of various interest groups and stakeholders in education 
decentralization experiments in Chicago in the late 1980s and New York City 
in the late 1960s); see also Marion Orr, The Challenge of School Reform in 
Baltimore: Race, Jobs, and Politics, in CHANGING URBAN EDUCATION 93 
(Clarence Stone ed., 1998) (arguing that urban schools are patronage machines 
and thus subject to rent-seeking by interest groups, especially teacher unions). 
67 SEYMOUR SARASON, THE PREDICTABLE FAILURE OF EDUCATIONAL 
REFORM 70 (1990). 
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policy learning on the part of lawyers.68 The reality is that most 
lawyers are perfectly capable of understanding core debates 
within education policy circles. Most can intelligently read the 
semi-technical academic literature that characterizes such 
debates, or at least the voluminous law review literature that 
summarizes various positions within such debates.69 On this 
point, Heubert’s claims that few education lawyers “know the 
fields of education and educational administration”70 and that 
“few know how to read and understand educational research”71 
are unconvincing. Instead, an equally plausible argument can be 
made that any additional policy learning will merely reveal that 
most areas of educational policy and practice are beset by 
empirical indeterminacy and deep value-based contentions.72 
Given the depth of disagreement on a range of empirical and 
values-based questions, lawyers and legal institutions appear to 
be left with a dismal role—mediating value clashes and 
interpreting statutory language against the backdrop of expert 
disagreement on efficacy. 
The extent of the impasse is not made clear in Law & School 
Reform, particularly since several of the contributors, true to the 
lawyerly cast of the book, adopt a brief-like tone and gloss over 
major areas of contention. For example, Gary Orfield cites social 
scientific research that purports to demonstrate the educational 
gains that flow from racial integration.73 He neglects to cite 
                                                          
68 Heubert, supra note 19, at 6-7. 
69 Michael Rebell, a lawyer himself, has written a number of law review 
articles that capably and clearly summarize highly technical debates in 
education policy circles. See Michael A. Rebell & Robert L. Hughes, Special 
Educational Inclusion and the Courts: A Proposal for a New Remedial 
Approach, 25 J.L. & EDUC. 523 (1996). 
70 Heubert, supra note 19, at 6 (citing A. Trotter, Flagrante Dilecto, AM. 
SCH. BOARD J., Dec. 1990, at 12-18). 
71 Heubert, supra note 19, at 6. 
72 Heubert seems to acknowledge this fact when he states that 
“establishing illegal discrimination will be more difficult when there is 
disagreement among educators and researchers about the value or necessity of 
the educational policy or practice in question.” Id. at 17. But he fails to 
develop the point. 
73 ORFIELD, supra note 1, at 41. 
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equally persuasive studies that demonstrate that the educational 
gains that accompany racial integration efforts are in fact quite 
small in the grand scheme of things and even difficult to prove 
empirically.74 Martin Gerry’s chapter on “service integration” 
reads like a brief in support of a community-centered and social 
service-oriented approach to public school reform that has 
increasingly drawn criticism from education scholars and 
practitioners alike.75 Even the fundamental goal of school finance 
reform—the narrowing of inter-district disparities in per-pupil 
spending—has been criticized by a line of scholarship that calls 
into question whether school spending has any appreciable effect 
on student outcomes.76 Similar empirical contentions characterize 
ongoing debates over special and bilingual education, particularly 
the question of the relative amount of time students should spend 
                                                          
74 See DAVID ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND 
THE LAW 59-116 (1995) (summarizing research on the harms of segregation 
and the benefits of integration, citing the inconsistent results obtained by social 
scientific studies, and questioning the effect of desegregation on academic 
achievement in particular). 
75 See AMERICAN INST. FOR RESEARCH, AN EDUCATOR’S GUIDE TO 
SCHOOLWIDE REFORM 4, app. C (1999) (concluding that only three of twenty-
four whole-school reform programs considered can muster convincing proof 
of positive effects on student achievement); PAUL T. HILL & MARY BETH 
CELIO, FIXING URBAN SCHOOLS 13-17, 28-30 (1998) (arguing that many 
reform programs are premised on under-specified causal theories of how 
program components will increase student learning); David M. Engstrom, 
Note, Post-Brown Politics, Whole-School Reform, and the Case of Norfolk, 
Virginia, 12 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 163, 164 (2001) (“[C]urrent urban 
school-reform efforts have suffered from a steady proliferation of reform 
packages that lack a convincing link to improved academic achievement.”). 
76 Dubbed the “cost-quality debate,” economists have churned out a 
number of rigorous empirical studies finding that school spending has little to 
no explanatory power with respect to student outcomes. These studies utilize a 
“production function” approach and regression analysis and conclude that 
there is no systematic relationship between educational inputs and outputs. 
See, e.g., ERIC A. HANUSHEK & CHARLES S. BENSON, MAKING SCHOOLS 
WORK: IMPROVING PERFORMANCE AND CONTROLLING COSTS 25-49 (1994); 
Eric A. Hanushek, When School Finance “Reform” May Not Be Good Policy, 
29 HARV. J. LEGIS. 423 (1991). 
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in separate versus mainstream classrooms.77 
Disagreement on values questions is equally prevalent. For 
instance, bilingual education policies raise deep questions about 
citizenship, assimilation, and cultural difference in a democratic 
society.78 Similarly, the political right’s embrace of color-
blindness as an organizing principle—and its resulting opposition 
to affirmative action—is based at least in part on a judgment that 
color-blindness will better serve the interests of white and 
                                                          
77 In the disability area, for example, experts disagree on a host of 
important variables, particularly the relative efficacy of mainstream as against 
special instruction. Special education experts cast the debate in terms of 
“inclusion” versus “placement diversity.” See Rebell, supra note 69, at 537. 
Advocates of the inclusionist perspective argue that teachers often lack a sound 
pedagogic basis for referral of particular students to special education, that 
special education programs are overly narrow and have little impact on student 
achievement, and that special placement has a stigmatizing effect that counters 
whatever small educational gains that eventuate. Proponents of placement 
diversity, by contrast, maintain that separation based on needs and special 
interventions—including individualized instruction, smaller classes, and highly 
trained teachers—produce important educational benefits. See Douglas 
Marston, The Effectiveness of Special Education: A Time Series Analysis of 
Reading Performance in Regular and Special Education Settings, 21 J. 
SPECIAL EDUC. 13, 13 (1987-88); Conrad Carlberg & Kenneth Kavale, The 
Efficacy of Special Versus Regular Class Placement for Exceptional Children: 
A Meta-Analysis, 14 J. SPECIAL EDUC. 295, 304 (1980). They also minimize 
the concern with stigma, arguing that labeling is only damaging when it comes 
about through inappropriate interventions. See Judith D. Singer, Should 
Special Education Merge with Regular Education?, 2 EDUC. POL’Y 409, 412 
(1988). For a nice overview, see David L. Kirp et al., Legal Reform of 
Special Education: Empirical Studies and Procedural Proposals, 62 CAL. L. 
REV. 40 (1974). Participants in bilingual education policy debates make many 
of the same moves. See Sonja Diaz-Granados, Note, How Can We Take Away 
a Right We Have Never Protected, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 827, 831 (1995) 
(comparing the “maintenance approach,” which emphasizes “a continuation of 
content area education within the bilingual program,” and a “transitional 
approach,” which “concentrates on quickly mainstreaming LEP students); see 
also ROSEMARY C. SALOMONE, EQUAL EDUCATION UNDER LAW 92 (1986). 
78 See John Rhee, Theories of Citizenship and Their Role in the Bilingual 
Education Debate, 33 COL. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 33 (1999). For broader 
discussion by political theorists, see WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL 
CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS (1996); CHARLES 
TAYLOR, MULTICULTURALISM (1996). 
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minority citizens alike over the long-term.79 Deep value clashes 
are also apparent in a variety of education policy areas not 
addressed by Law & School Reform. A good example is the 
implementation of “percent plans” in Texas, California, and 
Florida. High school students who graduate in, respectively, the 
top 10%, 4%, or 20% of their high school classes receive 
guaranteed admission—and in some cases, scholarship money—to 
any of the state’s flagship public universities.80 Proponents argue 
that such plans are a facially neutral means of increasing diversity 
in public higher education without using race-conscious 
admissions policies.81 Others argue that percent plans are a cop-
out, given that successful fulfillment of one of the plans’ 
principal goals of increasing diversity depends on continuing 
racial segregation at the secondary school level.82 Percent plans 
might also be open to criticism on the grounds that the plans send 
ill-prepared students to the state’s top schools, forcing those 
universities into the business of remedial education.83 
                                                          
79 See, e.g., TERRY EASTLAND, ENDING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: THE 
CASE FOR COLORBLIND JUSTICE (1996). Thus, affirmative action debates are 
in part just disagreement over empirical outcomes rather than values. One can 
imagine opponents in the debate arriving at the same vision of what a good 
society would look like in twenty years, but disagreeing as to whether 
affirmative action will get us there more efficaciously than color-blindness. 
80 See R. Richard Banks, Meritocratic Values and Race Outcomes: 
Defending Class-Based College Admissions, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1029, 1031 n.4 
(2001). For a detailed description of the Texas plan, see Danielle Holly & 
Delia Spencer, Note, The Texas Ten Percent Plan, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 245, 245 (1998). 
81 See Banks, supra note 80, at 1033-34. The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has also expressed implicit support for 
“percent plans.” Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 
1259 (11th Cir. 2001) (describing percent plans as one of several “innovative 
strategies” for increasing university diversity). 
82 See Jeffrey Selingo, What States Aren’t Saying About the “X-Percent 
Solution,” CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 2, 2000, at A31 (citing critics of 
percent plans who argue that use of high schools with large minority 
populations “exploits educational segregation while doing nothing to make 
schools better” and “discourage[s] states from integrating high schools”). 
83 Id. (reporting that even proponents of percent plans acknowledge that 
many students will not be ready for college and will be directed into summer 
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In addition to the specific program areas referenced in Law & 
School Reform, present-day education debates suffer from 
deeper—and perhaps even more intractable—empirical and 
values-based contention about what constitutes “equity” in the 
first place. As a society, we might wish to advance equity by 
remedying past resource deprivations, by weighing the relative 
prospective benefits of spending more on some students than 
others, or by creating greater equality of educational outcomes.84 
But any effort to “equalize” immediately runs into specification 
problems. Application of a strict equality principle might require 
the leveling of educational inputs—in other words, spending the 
same amount of dollars per pupil. Like the “equity” approach in 
school finance litigation, this is probably only aspirational given 
political realities. Alternatively, educational equity might be 
measured in terms of providing a minimal floor of educational 
services to each student, perhaps calculated to obtain a set of 
valued outcomes, as in the “adequacy” approach adopted by 
school finance litigants.85 This seems more reliable, but the 
adequacy approach to school finance finesses the relationship 
between inputs and outputs and assumes that a given quantum of 
education will ensure a given level of achievement and will thus 
be equally valuable to all students.86 
The problem is particularly pronounced in the educational 
context because social scientists know surprisingly little about the 
relationship between educational inputs and outputs or the extent 
                                                          
remedial classes). 
84 MARK KELMAN & GILLIAN LESTER, JUMPING THE QUEUE: AN INQUIRY 
INTO THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF STUDENTS WITH LEARNING DISABILITIES 9 
(1997). 
85 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
86 Inputs include teachers, curriculum, and other learning tools—in short, 
the stuff of the educational process. Outputs range from short-term 
achievement measures to long-term measures of vocational success and 
general life chances. As an aside, a number of political theorists have grappled 
with the relationship of inputs to outputs—particularly the fact that some 
individuals may be able to derive more of a given output from a fixed quantity 
of input—and have thus tried to look at equity of goods and services in terms 
of what “functionings” that a given good like education will facilitate. See 
AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED xi (1995). 
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to which academic achievement drives broader life chances. The 
most robust social scientific finding of the past four decades is an 
enduring and high correlation between academic achievement and 
family socio-economic status.87 A “familiar corollary” of this 
finding, as McUsic points out, is that “income and education of 
parents of fellow students is also highly correlated with 
performance.”88 The conclusion drawn by most experts is that 
income and education together create “social capital” or “cultural 
capital,” which can significantly improve overall educational 
outcomes.89 Second, the amount of resources available to schools 
matters, but perhaps not as much as one would expect. For 
instance, social scientists continue to squabble over the extent to 
which “money matters” in fostering high educational 
achievement. Although many economists argue that per-pupil 
spending has little to no effect on academic achievement,90 other 
studies have found that school inputs such as teacher salaries 
exert at least some influence on academic achievement.91 Equally 
                                                          
87 The most recent comprehensive treatment of the issue is SUSAN E. 
MAYER, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: FAMILY INCOME AND CHILDREN’S LIFE 
CHANCES (1997). Classic treatments include JAMES S. COLEMAN, EQUALITY 
OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966) and CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, 
INEQUALITY: A REASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT OF FAMILY AND SCHOOLING IN 
AMERICA (1972). 
88 One reason might be that relatively wealthier parents serve as 
“education connoisseurs” who agitate for quality; another commonly cited 
theory of causation is that poor children in relatively wealthier schools are 
confronted with role models of academic success. See McUsic, supra note 35, 
at 129; James S. Liebman, Voice, Not Choice, 101 YALE L.J. 259, 301 
(1991). 
89 See COLEMAN, supra note 87. Coleman coined the term “social 
capital”—sometimes referred to alternately as “cultural capital”—in an attempt 
to label the mysterious relationship between social privilege and educational 
attainment and achievement. 
90 See HANUSHEK, supra note 76. 
91 The teacher salary finding is particularly important because it suggests 
that expenditures may be driving outcomes, assuming that relatively wealthier 
schools have greater resources to identify and attract the most highly skilled 
teachers from the available teacher pool in a given area. Thus, it may not be 
absolute expenditures, but rather relative expenditures within a teacher labor 
pool that matters most, a fact that would foil most economistic regressions of 
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mixed results obtain in studies of early childhood education 
programs, even those that involve sustained commitment of 
enormous resources.92 Similarly, and as mentioned previously, 
there is little consensus on the efficacy of special education and 
bilingual instruction or the impact of desegregation on the 
academic achievement of African-Americans.93 The upshot is that 
it is probably indeterminate which groups stand to benefit and by 
how much under different resource configurations. 
In the concluding contribution to Law & School Reform, 
Weckstein optimistically claims that we currently have the 
necessary knowledge to effect substantial educational equity.94 
But the reality is that educational outcomes depend on a 
staggeringly complex web of variables and value judgments that, 
despite the best efforts of education experts to find consensus, 
remain deeply contested. One could try to dress up Heubert’s call 
for greater lawyer-led mediation of expert disputes with Rawlsian 
rhetoric and to portray lawyers as heroically overseeing the 
realization of “overlapping consensus.”95 But it is also 
questionable whether lawyers have any comparative advantage in 
such an enterprise. In short, a better-read education bar is not 
likely to break through the empirical and values impasse in 
education policy circles, even if lawyer-mediated reform efforts 
can help force choices between, say, relatively more or less 
mainstreaming of special education and bilingual students. 
                                                          
the sort conducted by Hanushek. See Ronald Ferguson, Paying for Public 
Education: New Evidence on How and Why Money Matters, 28 HARV. J. LEG. 
465 (1991); Martha L. Minow, School Finance: Does Money Matter?, 28 
HARV. J. LEG. 395 (1991). 
92 While programs such as Head Start have been criticized for their 
failure to demonstrate long-term effects, a number of other, more intensive 
early childhood programs have shown at least some medium- and long-term 
effects on academic achievement and life chances. See W. Steven Barnett, 
Long-Term Effects of Early Childhood Programs on Cognitive and School 
Outcomes, 5 FUTURE OF CHILDREN 25, 32-33, 38-39 (1995). 
93 See supra notes 74, 77 and accompanying text. 
94 Weckstein, supra note 18, at 307. 
95 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 133-72 (1993). 
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III.  THE LARGER PICTURE 
If there is reason to be skeptical about the value of the 
prescriptive proposals advanced in Law & School Reform, the 
book nonetheless does a great service in describing the current 
policy landscape. Criticisms aside, the essays in Law & School 
Reform together begin to sketch a larger and more dominant story 
that goes beyond Heubert’s narrow prescriptions for advancing 
educational equity reform. For instance, a crucial trend in law 
and education evident in the various contributions to the book is 
the declining significance of race-based resource claims. In 
addition, Molly McUsic’s insightful overview of school finance 
issues shows that lawyers have presided over the evolution of a 
system of federal mandates on behalf of disabled and limited 
English proficient students that exacerbates resource disparities 
for poor and minority students within the multi-tiered system of 
school finance that prevails in the United States.96 The overall 
trend might be described as a comparative strengthening of the 
resource claims of the disabled and a comparative weakening of 
claims based on race and class. While this trend is unfortunate 
from the perspective of minority and poor students, it also 
demonstrates two very different impulses in tension in law-driven 
school reform efforts. One is a bureaucratic impulse that focuses 
on targeted resource allocations as a way of improving 
educational outcomes. The other is a legal-cultural inclusionary 
impulse that extends from the peculiar power of the integration 
ideal as articulated in Brown v. Board of Education.97 
Understanding this tension is an important first step in 
understanding the larger picture of law-driven school reform’s 
effect on educational equity over the past fifty years. 
A.  The Declining Significance of Race-Based Resource 
Claims 
Brown v. Board of Education sits at the very top of the canon 
                                                          
96 McUsic, supra note 35, at 92-93. 
97 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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of American legal thought.98 But nowhere else in American law is 
the continuing rhetorical power of a court decision matched by so 
little remaining power as a reform tool. Indeed, an important part 
of the larger backdrop against which law-driven reform efforts 
have evolved over the second half of the twentieth century is the 
declining significance of race as a basis for resource claims. 
Evidence of the decline comes from a number of different 
quarters, but most explicitly in the demise of desegregation and 
affirmative action at the hands of an increasingly skeptical federal 
judiciary. Law & School Reform opens with the issue of 
desegregation. But Gary Orfield’s lengthy chapter focuses on the 
resegregation of American schools and the increasingly deaf ear 
of the federal judiciary to desegregation claims.99 In general, 
court-ordered desegregation plans that regulate student 
assignments are on the wane.100 Even the African-American 
community is increasingly agnostic about the value of continued 
desegregation efforts.101 The outlook is equally bleak on the 
                                                          
98 J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 
111 HARV. L. REV. 963, 974 n.43 (1998). 
99 See generally ORFIELD, supra note 1. For relevant Supreme Court 
caselaw, see Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 
U.S. 467 (1992); Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991); Milliken v. 
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
100 In the last ten years, for example, courts have closed school 
desegregation cases in Buffalo, Denver, Savannah, Oklahoma City, 
Wilmington, and Charlotte-Mecklenburg and have constructed “exit plans” for 
Dallas, Kansas City, and Little Rock. See Wendy Parker, The Future of 
School Desegregation, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1157, 1157-58 (2000). Note, 
however, that Parker argues that widespread claims that desegregation efforts 
are dead are overstated. Id. 
101 Recent public opinion surveys have shown that an overwhelming 
majority of African-American parents believe that “the higher priority of the 
nation’s schools should be to raise academic standards rather than focus on 
achieving more diversity and integration.” See PUB. AGENDA, TIME TO MOVE 
ON: AFRICAN-AMERICAN AND WHITE PARENTS SET AN AGENDA FOR PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS 31 (1998) (reporting results of a survey conducted by Public Agenda 
and the Public Education Network); see also, Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. 
Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. 
REV. 518, 528 (1980) (suggesting that the interest of blacks in quality 
education might be better served by “focusing on ‘educational components’” 
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affirmative action front. As an example, in what may prove to be 
the final triumph of the color-blindness principle in equal 
protection jurisprudence in education, the University of Michigan 
is currently fighting a rear-guard action in its effort to retain an 
admissions program that relies on weak racial preferences.102 
Another marker of the shift away from race-based claims is 
that much of the important doctrinal innovation over the past two 
decades has been confined to non-race-based policies. For 
instance, while the Supreme Court foreclosed school finance 
reform efforts in the federal courts in San Antonio Independent 
School District v. Rodriguez,103 the constitutionality of school 
finance regimes has produced interesting doctrinal developments 
at the state level and has served as a leading example of an 
expanded state court role in constitutional adjudication—dubbed 
the “new judicial federalism.”104 At the same time, the federal 
                                                          
rather than continued efforts at integration). 
102 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001); 
Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811 (E.D. Mich. 2000). Both cases are 
currently before the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Fifth Circuit has 
already held that similar affirmative action admissions programs at the 
University of Texas are unconstitutional. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 
(1996); see also Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234 
(11th Cir. 2001) (calling the question of diversity-goals “an open question,” 
and striking down the affirmative action program on tailoring grounds). The 
Ninth Circuit has determined, however, that diversity is a compelling enough 
state interest for affirmative action at the University of Washington to pass 
muster. See Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 
2000) (upholding affirmative action and finding diversity to be a compelling 
state interest). The Supreme Court is likely to grant certiorari in the Michigan 
case and will determine whether Powell’s plurality opinion in Regents of the 
Univ. of Cal v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305 (1978), is still good law. 
103 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding that equal educational funding is not a 
fundamental right under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
104 For discussion of the “equity” and “adequacy” approaches to school 
finance litigation, see supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. For general 
discussion of the “new judicial federalism,” see Douglas S. Reed, Twenty-Five 
Years After Rodriguez: School Finance Litigation and the Impact of the New 
Judicial Federalism, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 175, 176 (1998). For an early 
articulation, see William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: 
ENGSTROMMACRO4-25.DOC 7/16/02  2:11 PM 
 LAWYERS AND EDUCATIONAL EQUITY 417 
courts have decided a neverending string of cases that define the 
boundaries of accommodations required under the IDEA and The 
Bilingual Education Act.105 
By contrast, race has seen little state-level doctrinal 
innovation with the possible exception of an isolated effort to 
combine school finance and race issues in Sheff v. O’Neill.106 
Moreover, the limited doctrinal development relating to race has 
actually worked to narrow available race-based legal claims. 
During the most recent term, the Supreme Court handed down 
Alexander v. Sandoval,107 settling a long-standing question of 
whether litigants can bring claims under a disparate impact 
standard in Title VI implementing regulations.108 The Court 
answered no and, in one fell swoop, eliminated the legal tool 
most used by education lawyers to challenge discriminatory 
practices in a variety of policy areas, including bilingual 
education,109 intra-district racial segregation,110 and the critical 
                                                          
The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 548-49 (1986). 
105 For review of IDEA caselaw, see supra note 30. The principal 
Supreme Court case regarding bilingual education is Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 
563 (1974). For a review of federal caselaw since Lau, see Ronald D. 
Wenkart, Native Language Instruction and the Special Education Student: 
Who Decides the Instructional Methodology?, 125 ED. L. REP. 581, 587-90 
(1998). 
106 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996). 
107 532 U.S. 1049 (2001). 
108 Id. In Sandoval, the Court held that § 602 of Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act does not authorize a private right of action under a disparate-impact 
standard as provided by implementing regulations, forcing litigants to bring 
suit under § 601 under the more restrictive intentional discrimination standard. 
Of course, and as Justice Stevens pointed out in dissent, the Court’s holding is 
“something of a sport” for the moment, id. at 300 (Stevens, J., dissenting), so 
long as plaintiffs are able to bring such claims under § 1983. However, the 
Court recently granted certiorari on a case that squarely raises the question. 
See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 122 S. Ct. 865 (2002). 
109 Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (holding that Title VI 
proscription of discrimination by federal funding recipients obligated school 
district to provide bilingual educational services to non-English-speaking 
students). 
110 See ORFIELD, supra note 1. 
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new area of racial impact in standardized testing.111 The result is 
that education lawyers currently face a steadily shrinking toolkit 
from which they can draw in bringing equal protection and other 
race-based anti-discrimination claims. 
The federal courts have clearly done the most to scale back 
the reach of Brown, but the trend away from race-conscious 
policies is equally evident outside the legal establishment. Indeed, 
concern with overall educational quality moved ahead of race on 
most policy agendas after an unremitting series of reports 
beginning in the 1980s warned of a “rising tide of mediocrity” in 
American public education.112 Of particular note has been the 
increasing dominance of the standards-based approach to 
education reform at the state and federal levels113 and the 
proliferation of “whole-school reform” models that provide an 
off-the-rack reform template to individual schools.114 The result is 
that the past two decades have witnessed an extraordinary amount 
of education reform activity within state legislatures, universities, 
private foundations, and big-city school districts, but 
comparatively less policy activity that aims to foster racial 
                                                          
111 See, e.g., Debra P. v. Turlington, 644 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1981). For 
an overview of the law of “high stakes testing,” see Paul T. O’Neill, Special 
Education and High Stakes Testing for High School Graduation: An Analysis 
of Current Law and Policy, 30 J.L. EDUC. 185 (2001). 
112 See, e.g., NAT’L COMM’N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT 
RISK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM 5 (1983). Other 
commission and foundation reports decrying the state of American public 
education include NAT’L GOVERNOR’S ASS’N, TIME FOR RESULTS: THE 
GOVERNORS’ 1991 REPORT ON EDUC. (1991); TASK FORCE ON EDUC. FOR 
ECON. GROWTH, EDUC. COMM’N OF THE STATES, ACTION FOR EXCELLENCE: 
A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN TO IMPROVE OUR NATION’S SCHOOLS; and ERNEST 
BOYER, HIGH SCHOOL: A REPORT ON SECONDARY EDUC. IN AM., THE 
CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING (1983). 
113 The standards movement aims to link student performance on 
standardized tests to well-enforced rewards and sanctions as a means of 
creating incentives for school reform and signaling locations within the system 
where additional resources need to be devoted. See Helen F. Ladd, 
Introduction, in HOLDING SCHOOLS ACCOUNTABLE: PERFORMANCE-BASED 
REFORMS IN EDUCATION 5 (Helen F. Ladd ed., 1996). 
114 See Engstrom, supra note 75. 
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integration or that specifically funnels resources to minority 
students.115 
B. Federalism-Based Resource Disparities 
A second aspect of the larger picture painted by the various 
contributions to Law & School Reform is the extent to which law-
driven reform efforts in one area of educational policy interact 
with reform efforts in other areas and sometimes produce 
unintended consequences. The bird’s eye view provided by the 
contributors to Law & School Reform brings this fact into relief. 
For example, an important legacy of law-driven reform efforts is 
that legal mobilization on behalf of disabled students and, to a 
lesser extent, limited English proficient students, has produced a 
federal statutory rights scheme that exacerbates resource 
disparities for poor and minority students. 
On this point, the most valuable contribution to Law & School 
Reform comes from Molly McUsic, who convincingly argues that 
the current system allocates resources in ways that shortchange 
students in poor school districts.116 McUsic summarizes the 
“three central features” of resource inequalities in the American 
system as follows: 
The legal system that delivers this order of educational 
inequality is a unique combination of unfunded federal 
mandates affecting local districts unequally, state legal 
structures that deliver and fund education on a 
geographical basis (segregating children largely by race 
                                                          
115 Hess reports that an estimated 3,000 school-reform measures were 
implemented in the 1980s. By 1984, 275 state-level task forces were focusing 
on education. See FREDERICK M. HESS, SPINNING WHEELS: THE POLITICS OF 
URBAN SCHOOL REFORM 9 (1999). The sheer number of edited volumes 
devoted to the topic further evidences the high volume of urban school policy 
discussion. See, e.g., CHANGING URBAN EDUCATION (Clarence Stone ed., 
1998); NEW SCHOOLS FOR A NEW CENTURY: THE REDESIGN OF URBAN 
EDUCATION (Diane Ravitch & Joseph Viteritti eds., 1997); STRATEGIES FOR 
SCHOOL EQUITY: CREATING PRODUCTIVE SCHOOLS IN A JUST SOCIETY 
(Marilyn Gittell ed., 1998). 
116 McUsic, supra note 35, at 92-93. 
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and class), and a subsidized system of private schools that 
serves fewer than 10 percent of schoolchildren.117 
While most lawyers and educators are familiar with the 
advantages conferred by private schooling and the resource 
disparities that arise from local fiscal control, substantially fewer 
are probably aware of the allocational impact of unfunded federal 
mandates relating to special and bilingual education.118 
The allocational impact of federal mandates such as IDEA 
stems from the failure of the federal government to fund the cost 
of such mandates at anything above token levels.119 Reliable 
estimates of total special education spending by local school 
districts as mandated by IDEA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act exceed $58 billion, more than $33 billion above the cost of 
providing nonspecial education to those students.120 Thus, 
disabled students receive a little less than one-fifth of total 
resources in the system, even though disabled students represent 
less than one-tenth of the total student population.121 But 
Congress has never provided more than 13% of special education 
funding (in 1980), and throughout the 1990s paid between 7% 
and 8%.122 The result is that, of the $33 billion in marginal 
expenditures for special education students, Congress foots the 
                                                          
117 Id. at 89. 
118 For a general discussion of unfunded mandates, see Julie A. Roin, 
Reconceptualizing Unfunded Mandates and Other Regulations, 93 N.W. L. 
REV. 351 (1999). 
119 The foregoing discussion is taken largely from McUsic, supra note 35, 
at 95-97. 
120 See Jay G. Chambers et al., What Are We Spending on Special 
Education in the U.S.?, Center for Special Education Finance (Feb. 1998), 
available at http://csef.air.org/papers/brief8.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2002). 
121 Total education expenditures at the federal, state, and local level in 
1998 were $328 billion. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 2000, supra note 2, at 
172 tbl. 275. The total number of students ages six to twenty-one served under 
IDEA in 1996-97 was 5,235,952. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, TO 
ASSURE THE FREE APPROPRIATE PUBLIC EDUCATION OF ALL CHILDREN WITH 
DISABILITIES, supra note 4, at ii-16. The total student enrollment in the United 
States in 1997 was nearly fifty-two million. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 2000, 
supra note 2, at 151 tbl. 239. 
122 McUsic, supra note 35, at 95. 
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bill for approximately $2 billion. The remaining $31 billion falls 
to states and local school districts. Similarly, in the last year that 
the Department of Education issued a report to Congress, more 
than 2.3 million limited English proficient students received 
services under the Bilingual Education Act; the federal 
government paid for the cost of educating only about 251,000, or 
less than 11%, of them.123 
The perverse effect of token federal funding of federal 
mandates is fewer resources for poor, minority, and non-special 
education students. The reason is that enforceable federal rights 
under IDEA and the Bilingual Education Act require school 
districts to allocate resources first to special education and 
bilingual students, with the remainder going toward the education 
of nonspecial education students.124 In addition, special education 
and limited-English proficient students tend to be concentrated in 
relatively poorer school districts.125 The result is that poorer 
districts must allocate a disproportionate share of total resources 
to compliance efforts under federal mandates.126 As McUsic 
explains, the “predictable result” of this arrangement is that “a 
greater share of elementary and secondary school spending over 
the past twenty years has been allocated to special needs leaving 
a shrinking share available for nonspecial education.”127 And in 
poor school districts in particular, unfunded federal mandates 
leave substantially fewer resources for below-average students—
particularly what Mark Kelman and Gillian Lester call “garden 
variety bad readers”128—who might make equally compelling 
claims to scarce educational resources. 
                                                          
123 OFFICE OF BILINGUAL EDUCATION AND MINORITY LANGUAGE 
AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, THE CONDITION OF BILINGUAL 
EDUCATION: A REPORT TO CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 20 (1992). 
124 McUsic, supra note 35, at 97. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 KELMAN & LESTER, supra note 84, at 24, 147-48. 
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C.  Competing Reform Impulses and the Peculiar Legacy of 
Brown 
A final theme one might glean from the assembled 
contributions to Law & School Reform is that law-driven school 
reform efforts of the past five decades display a deep tension 
between two very different reformist impulses. One is a 
bureaucratic impulse that uses highly targeted resource infusions 
as a means of maximizing the educational outcomes—and thus the 
life chances—of specific student groups. This impulse extends to 
efforts to advance educational equity by raising achievement 
levels of African-Americans, the poor, the disabled, the limited 
English proficient, or any other group perceived to be in a 
position to benefit from additional resources. 
Another equally powerful impulse is a legal and cultural 
impulse extending from Brown v. Board of Education129 and the 
broader civil rights movements of the post-war period. The 
Brown impulse is a broader inclusionary vision and, while also 
aimed at increasing the life chances of disfavored and 
disadvantaged groups, is also deeply concerned with a broader 
republican vision of equality that sees the participation of 
excluded groups in mainstream democratic discourse and social 
and economic life as ultimately redounding to the benefit of all.130 
Reform efforts aimed at desegregation and the education of 
disabled and LEP students are founded at least in part on this 
broader inclusionary vision. 
As a policy analysis matter, the two reformist impulses seem 
to pose a basic incommensurability problem.131 How can 
reformers weigh the relative value of educational achievement 
                                                          
129 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
130 See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism: Educating for 
Citizenship, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 131 (1995) (exploring the possibility of a 
constitutional right to education through analysis of the requirements of 
“republican citizenship”). 
131 See Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 
MICH. L. REV. 779, 796 (1994) (“Incommensurability occurs when the 
relevant goods cannot be aligned along a single metric without doing violence 
to our considered judgments about how these goods are best characterized.”). 
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against the values of democratic solidarity, tolerance, or 
appreciation of human difference that comes with the integration 
of students of color and students with disabilities into mainstream 
classrooms?132 No unitary metric accounts for how policymakers 
actually think about the two kinds of benefits. As a result, 
judging the desirability of different law-driven reform avenues 
requires reformers to weigh costs and benefits at two very 
different levels of abstraction. 
Of course, critics may argue in response that this 
incommensurability problem is not insurmountable. 
Incommensurability need not entail incomparability as a matter of 
policy analysis. Legislators and other policymakers, for example, 
frequently weigh costs and benefits between policy outputs to 
which most economists would attach the incommensurability 
label. Similarly, critics may point out that the alleged tension 
between bureaucratic and inclusionary reform impulses is little 
more than a disagreement about the proper institutional mission 
of public schools. For instance, some commentators have long 
argued that schools are too often used as instruments for realizing 
a broader social vision and that this takes schools away from a 
more appropriate and more focused pedagogical mission.133 As an 
example, the “back to basics” movement that swept education 
policy circles in the 1980s and 1990s was, at least in part, an 
effort to refocus the mission of public schools.134 But others—
going all the way back to John Dewey—see moral and political 
                                                          
132 Scholars are equally concerned with various “soft” variables, 
including the extent of stigma that attaches to separate instruction. See 
MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION 
AND AMERICAN LAW 35-39, 81-86 (1992) (arguing that “least restrictive 
environment” determinations in the special education context pose a difficult 
“choice between specialized services and some degree of separate treatment on 
the one side, and minimized labeling and minimized segregation, on the 
other”). 
133 See DIANE RAVITCH, LEFT BACK: A CENTURY OF FAILED SCHOOL 
REFORMS 15-16 (2000) (arguing that progressive education theorists attempted 
to make schools more “socially useful,” but instead merely diluted and 
minimized the core academic curriculum). 
134 Id. 
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instruction as central to the educational mission of public 
schools.135 
Law & School Reform, however, places competing reform 
approaches side-by-side and helps make the case that the tension 
is real and has had important distributive implications. Indeed, 
what the contributions to Law & School Reform together suggest, 
and what is particularly ironic in the education context, is that 
judicial foreclosure of race-based resource claims has meant that 
the powerful vision of social inclusion articulated in Brown 
currently bolsters resource claims made by disabled students, but 
not resource claims made by poor or African-American students, 
the latter of whom were its original intended beneficiaries. One 
peculiar and ironic legacy of Brown, then, is fewer educational 
resources for African-Americans. 
IV. THE ROLE OF LAWYERS 
A.  Are Lawyers to Blame? 
To what extent are lawyers culpable in any of the above? To 
be sure, identifying trends is not the same as assigning blame. 
One might argue that the role played by lawyers in past school 
reform efforts is perfectly understandable. For instance, it is well 
known that the systemic distributional consequences of individual 
litigation efforts are a traditional blind spot for the judicial system 
as a whole.136 In addition, lawyers advocate on behalf of 
particular groups of clients in pursuit of particular outcomes. 
And, in so doing, lawyers remain bound by professional-ethical 
obligations that demand zealous pursuit of client interests. 
Lawyers as a whole also tend to view the social world through 
the lens of the creation and vindication of rights. Given that the 
dominant legal understanding sees rights as trumps that immunize 
                                                          
135 See generally JOHN DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND EDUCATION (1997). 
136 See HOROWITZ, supra note 46, at 32-62 (describing the problems of 
information, vision, and piecemeal adjudication that are unique to the judicial 
process). 
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individual rights-bearers from majoritarian decision-making,137 it 
is perhaps unfair to argue that lawyers should be better attuned to 
the global budgeting process that drives most social policymaking 
in non-legal, non-rights-oriented contexts. 
Also, the traditional blindness of lawyers to the distributional 
consequences of law-driven school reform efforts may not be 
grounds for critique at all, but rather should be seen as laudable 
and entirely consistent with the institutional role of lawyers. We 
might even believe that the lawyers-as-hired-guns model 
maximizes institutional performance of the judicial system, 
whether as a truth-seeking device or as a forum for resolving 
competing resource claims.138 And to the extent that lawyers 
engaged in law-driven school reform efforts are self-consciously 
practicing so-called “cause lawyering,” it would be difficult to 
critique education lawyers for attempting to connect morality to 
law, particularly if such efforts ultimately legitimate the 
profession and the legal system as a whole.139 In short, to lay 
blame at the feet of education lawyers requires a deeper—and 
likely unsuccessful—critique of the lawyerly craft and 
institutional role. 
B.  The Future of Law-Driven School Reform 
The more important question is, how might law-driven 
reform efforts advance educational equity in the future? At the 
end of the day, Law & School Reform provides very little 
concrete guidance to education lawyers going forward. The 
prescriptions are simply too narrow. Reading Law & School 
                                                          
137 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 184-205 (1977). 
For further discussion of various rights conceptions, see Richard H. Pildes, 
Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and 
Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEG. STUD. 725 (1998). 
138 See, e.g., STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A 
DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE 44-51(1984). 
139 See Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and the 
Reproduction of Professional Authority: An Introduction, in CAUSE 
LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 
3 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998). 
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Reform, one cannot help but think that law-driven reform efforts 
will never again impact educational equity to the same extent that 
earlier, Brown-inspired challenges did.140 Instead, future reform 
efforts will likely center on the much more mundane task of 
optimizing resource allocations within the system as a whole. 
And without denigrating what remains an important task, what is 
most depressing from a lawyerly perspective is that it is not clear 
why lawyers and litigation enjoy any comparative advantage in 
any of the tasks that lie ahead. 
That said, Law & School Reform is a valuable contribution to 
the literature because it is the first volume of its kind to juxtapose 
the various approaches through which lawyers, law, and legal 
institutions have engaged the educational system in an effort to 
advance educational equity. The book thus represents a coherent 
attempt to do what legal scholars and policy advocates have only 
recently started to do—to think hard about how different legal 
movements fit together and judge the relative efficacy of 
available law-driven reform approaches.141 Here is where Law & 
School Reform promises to spur interesting debate. And here is 
where Heubert’s take on the issues is not so vulnerable to critique 
as it is to the thought that he might have productively taken his 
call for policy learning even further. 
Policy learning may be precisely what is needed because 
much of the explanation for trends in the allocation of educational 
resources is political. Legal scholarship has only just begun to 
critique the political presuppositions and theories of anti-
                                                          
140 Of course, recent scholarship also argues that Brown may have been 
less effective than most lawyers had thought, see ROSENBERG, supra note 8, at 
49-54 (summarizing data on the relationship of the Court’s Brown decision and 
actual desegregation of public schools), or even counterproductive, see 
Michael Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 
VA. L. REV. 7, 10-11 & n.10 (1994) (arguing that racial change would have 
come regardless of Brown, and that the Court’s decision may have actually 
forestalled federal legislative change by crystallizing southern white 
resistance). 
141 See, e.g., James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 
249, 254, 256 (1999) (assessing the relative efficacy of desegregation and 
school finance reform and arguing for more of the former). 
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discrimination that underpin redistributive claims in the education 
policy context.142 Some have argued that the disabled are a 
readily identifiable and socially salient subset of the student 
population, and that their claims for resource infusions are 
strengthened because of the ease with which disabled students can 
be constructed as a plausible deserving group.143 In addition, and 
as Heubert observes, “Minority children, poor children, and 
immigrant children do not enjoy as much political or legal 
support as do children whose defining characteristic—disability—
cuts across all economic classes and racial groups.”144 The 
disabled clearly enjoy an enormous amount of political power, at 
least relative to other more diffuse and less well-organized 
groups.145 In addition, the IDEA was pushed through Congress 
with surprisingly little opposition, buffeted in part by middle 
class parents in search of additional resources and a less 
stigmatizing label for their under-achieving children.146 Finally, it 
is worth noting that legislative efforts on behalf of the learning 
disabled took place in a post-1960s Washington policymaking 
environment that is seen by many political scientists as 
increasingly receptive to narrow interest group claims.147 
                                                          
142 The most thoughtful contribution by far is KELMAN & LESTER, supra 
note 84. However, Kelman and Lester focus exclusively on special education 
and, in particular, those students labeled “learning disabled” (“LD”), and do 
not compare special education and race-based claims. For a broader treatment 
of the “difference dilemma” at the heart of redistributive politics, see MINOW, 
supra note 132. 
143 On this point, see KELMAN & LESTER, supra note 84, at 197. The 
authors claim that this construction matters most of all because it takes 
advantage of a basic distinction that underpins nearly all American welfare 
state politics—between the deserving and undeserving poor. See also MICHAEL 
B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR: FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE 
WAR ON WELFARE 10 (1989); Michele L. Landis, Fate, Responsibility, and 
“Natural” Disaster Relief: Narrating the American Welfare State, 33 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 257, 257 (1999). 
144 Heubert, supra note 19, at 16. 
145 See JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS (1973). 
146 See KELMAN & LESTER, supra note 84. 
147 The IDEA emerged during the post-1960s dispersal of power in the 
Washington policymaking environment that some political scientists have 
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Programs that serve minority and poor students, by contrast, 
suffer from a form of “entitlement creep,” a familiar 
phenomenon whereby government programs—particularly means-
tested benefits—gradually creep up the socio-economic ladder 
and are distributed to claimants eager to take advantage of 
government largesse.148 Title I of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act was initially conceived as a means of topping up 
education spending and funneling additional federal resources to 
poor and, in particular, heavily African-American districts.149 
The program has evolved, however, in very different directions. 
As McUsic points out, 
[T]he same political forces that shape and preserve the 
current legal regime also shaped Title I, turning it, in 
effect, into a pork barrel program with funds for every 
congressional district, and thereby turning federal funds 
                                                          
argued increased the receptivity of the political system to narrow interest 
group claims. The most notable changes, which likely drove the others, were 
internal reforms in Congress to a freewheeling and decentralized committee 
system that increased interest group access. See Paul J. Quirk, Policy Making 
in the Contemporary Congress: Three Dimensions of Performance, in THE 
NEW POLITICS OF PUBLIC POLICY 228, 229 (Mark K. Landy & Martin A. 
Levin eds., 1995). In particular, a process once dominated by policy 
“subgovernments”—characterized by close relations between an oligarchically 
organized Congress and powerful private interests—now takes place within 
more inclusive and diffuse “issue networks” inhabited by a more complex 
array of stake-holders and stake-challengers. See Hugh Heclo, Issue Networks 
and the Executive Establishment, in THE NEW AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 
87, 88 (Anthony King ed., 1978). In addition, the development of 
sophisticated media technologies and changes in the electoral system—
including the post-1972 embrace of direct primaries and campaign finance 
reforms—have produced “candidate-centered” campaigns while simultaneously 
weakening party affiliations. See Martin P. Wattenberg, From a Partisan to a 
Candidate-Centered Electorate, in THE NEW AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 
139, 140 (Anthony King ed., 1990). 
148 See ROBERT E. GOODIN & JULIAN LE GRAND, NOT ONLY THE POOR: 
THE MIDDLE CLASSES AND THE WELFARE STATE 3 (1987) (arguing that the 
non-poor play a major role in “creating, expanding, sustaining, reforming, 
and dismantling the welfare state” and that their involvement is at least in part 
driven by their desire to capture programs for their direct benefit). 
149 See 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (1994); McUsic, supra note 35, at 94. 
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intended to be more or less equalizing across states and 
districts into payments that were more or less equal across 
states and districts.150 
As of 1993, McUsic continues, approximately 90% of the 
nation’s school districts and 71% of all public elementary schools 
received Title I funding.151 
At a time when the educational system is wrestling with 
fundamental questions of “who gets what, when, how,” it seems 
that the most productive activities in which lawyers can engage 
are proactive, challenging dialogue about future policy options 
and pressing for a fair allocation of resources within the political 
process that may or may not be skewing redistributions in 
unintended ways. As an example, lawyers are already playing an 
important role in rapidly proliferating litigation challenging the 
establishment and placement of charter schools.152 Thus, lawyers 
can make a critical contribution by ensuring that reform 
approaches do not disproportionately aid the better-off at the 
expense of the worse-off. In addition, the organization and 
delivery of public education is clearly in for substantial change in 
the coming years. Non-legal scholars have begun to stake out a 
position that calls for a re-alignment of the entire system of 
school finance at all three levels of government.153 And on 
January 8, 2002, President Bush signed into law the “No Child 
Left Behind Act,” described by some as the most sweeping 
federal school measure since passage of the Elementary and 
                                                          
150 McUsic, supra note 35, at 94. 
151 Id. at 94. 
152 See, e.g., Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Toward a Pragmatic Understanding 
of Status-Consciousness: The Case of Deregulated Education, 50 DUKE L.J. 
753, 758 n.15 (documenting litigation challenging charter schools that are 
“status identifiable” and thus aim to prevent actual and prospective charter 
schools from disproportionately aiding elites or practicing various forms of 
discrimination). 
153 See, e.g., KENNETH K. WONG, FUNDING PUBLIC SCHOOLS: POLITICS 
AND POLICIES 1-2 (1999) (arguing that the key to maximizing the performance 
of the educational system as a whole is the creation of decision rules that 
better align and allocate resources among levels of government). 
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Secondary Education Act in 1965.154 Changes to the system will 
undoubtedly provide opportunities and challenges for reform-
minded lawyers. 
CONCLUSION 
In the end, Law & School Reform is an outstanding and 
much-needed contribution to the field of law and education 
scholarship. It is notable that the book bills itself as being “not 
solely for legal experts or scholars but for a general audience of 
educators, advocates, policy makers, parents, and scholars 
interested in school reform.”155 For general audiences, the book 
elegantly covers a tremendous amount of territory. 
Unfortunately, for lawyers seeking to use their lawyerly skills to 
increase educational equity, the book probably falls short as a 
how-to guide. Even so, this may be the ultimate strength of Law 
& School Reform, particularly given what lies ahead. Indeed, 
what emerges from the juxtaposition of different reform 
approaches in Law & School Reform is a sense that lawyers can 
contribute greatly to the advancement of educational equity not 
by becoming more informed about the nuts and bolts of specific 
education practice areas or by initiating additional litigation, but 
rather by becoming better and more persuasive policy wonks. By 
continuing to think about how legal strategies interact, what kinds 
of educational equity are worth pursuing, and which groups are 
likely to emerge as winners and losers in the political process, 
lawyers can continue to broaden and deepen educational equity in 
ways that balance the competing impulses within prior law-driven 
                                                          
154 See Helen Dewar, Landmark Education Legislation Gets Final 
Approval in Congress, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2001, at A8. Among other 
things, the bill mandates standardized testing for all students from grades three 
through eight, imposes sanctions against schools that do not demonstrate 
steady improvement over a twelve year period, provides failing schools with 
additional money for tutoring and other services, increases the federal share of 
special education costs, and sets into motion a limited form of school choice, 
whereby students in perpetually failing schools will be free to attend 
neighboring schools if their own schools fail to meet performance goals. Id. 
155 Heubert, supra note 19, at 8. 
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reform efforts. By making available in a single volume nearly 
fifty years of law-driven school reform efforts, Law & School 
Reform almost certainly helps to move education lawyers down 
that path. 
 
